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INTRODUCTION 
We live in unsettling times. While this lament may be endemic to the human condition, social 
polarizations and environmental degradations of the early twenty-first century raise anew 
questions about our ability to protect and plan for any kind of common future. From the United 
KingĚŽŵ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽůĞĂǀĞƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŽŶĂůĚdƌƵŵƉĂƐWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ
of the United States, various fears, anxieties, uncertainties and resentments are finding political 
expression. The fragile system of global geopolitical and economic order that emerged in the 
wake of the Cold War seems to be gradually unraveling as the social and spatial inequalities 
they produced are sparking agitation and opposition, but without the outlines of any clear 
alternative coming into view (Streeck, 2016). At the local and regional scales political and social 
resistance extends across North America and the UK, but also France, Sweden, Greece and 
Turkey as outlined in the recent book by Mustafa Dikec (2017) Urban Rage: The Revolt of the 
Excluded.  Protests and rage are also found outside the urban environment, as when long-
standing environmental concerns over the pace of natural resource extraction find 
ĐŽŵŵŽŶĂůŝƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚ/ŶĚŝŐĞŶŽƵƐƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ?ŽŶŐŽŝŶŐƐƚƌƵŐůĞƐĨŽƌƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ PƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?^ƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ
Rock protests in South Dakota being one of many examples. This troubling conjuncture raises 
questions about how to intervene and steer societal trajectories in the 21st Century. Questions 
that are central to urban planning.   
 
As Friedmann reminds us, planning theorists have a particular role to play in interpreting and 
responding to the times we find ourselves living within: 
 
Theorists are forever watching the world as it goes through its transformations. 
For some this is an exciting project, but planners are not journalists who can 
dispassionately observe the passing scene. They have to ask themselves, given the 
reality of what is happening, can planning powers intervene to shift the balance of 
forces towards goals of social justice and inclusion in the ongoing process of urban 
and regional restructuring, and with what tools at hand? (2008: 250) 
 
If planning theory has long concerned itself with the translation of knowledge to action 
(Friedmann, 1987; Campbell, 2012), we argue here that any response to unsettling times must 
reexamine where and how planning knowledge is produced, shared, and valued and how that 
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affects the forms of action such knowledge makes possible. To the extent that theory sets the 
terms of debate and intervention for planning action, we note how difficult it has been for our 
field to establish ways of knowing that either complicate the drive for action or reshape 
outcomes for people or the planet.  For instance, communicative reason promises to bring 
people together in new and creative ways. But too often people are invited to take a seat at the 
table only to find the real decisions have already been made elsewhere.  Agonistic conflict 
provides an alternative means of engaging, as long as we arm ourselves with the tools for the 
struggles ahead. But it can often feel like turning up for a gun-fight armed only with a knife. 
 
In searching for ways forward, it is important to question how such theories shape the 
possibilities we see in the world such that other knowledges, positions and practices may be 
rendered invisible. This has been a persistent concern within planning theory (Watson, 2003; 
Porter, 2012), particularly for theorists working at the margins of the white, bi-continental 
centres of planning thought who have drawn attention to alternative translations of knowledge 
to action (see contributions to Sandercock 1998a). One example of this effort can be found in 
/ŶĚŝŐĞŶŽƵƐƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐ ?ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĂĐĂĚĞŵǇ ?^ƵĐŚǁŽƌŬĐĂůůƐ
attention to the deep sense of personal, political and intellectual unsettlement that comes from 
Ă “ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬƚhat privileges settler [non-Indigenous] understandings of place and 
ƐƉĂĐĞ ? ?WĂƚƌŝĐŬ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?DĂƚƵŶŐĂƚĂŬĞƐƚŚŝƐůŝŶĞŽĨƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂƐƚĞƉĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝĨ
 “ ?ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐĚŽŶŽƚĨŝƚ ?ĂŶĚŝĨƚŚĞǇĐĂŶŶŽƚŽƌǁŽƌƐĞƐƚŝůůǁŝůůŶŽƚ ?ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶĚindigenous 
experience  W ƚŚĞŽŶůǇŽƉƚŝŽŶůĞĨƚŝƐƚŽĚŝƚĐŚƚŚĞŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƵŶƵƐƵĂů ?ŵƵůƚŝ-authored 
ĞƐƐĂǇ ?ǁĞĚƌĂǁŝŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐĞ/ŶĚŝŐĞŶŽƵƐƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐ ?ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŽŶƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽunsettle 
the planning academy by questioning who is producing planning theory and for what purposes. 
We wish to argue that the challenges associated with the production of planning knowledges 
needs to be repositioned at the center of theoretical inquiry for three key reasons:  
 
භ First of all, even when planning action has been taken beyond the bounds of what 
technocratic, rational analysis (the target of early planning theory) would 
recommend, empirical conditions demonstrate that socio-spatial planning has not 
been successful at providing for the interests of many people and environments 
around the globe. Thus, it seems essential to ask ourselves: are we posing the right 
questions that can help advance understanding of the knowledge(s)-action(s) 
relationship? What knowledges then are shaping these trajectories  W whose are 
they, where and how are they produced and sustained, and how can planning 
theory help to expose and reconstitute these processes?  
 
භ Secondly, because knowledge does shape action, if imperfectly and inefficiently, its 
sources and purveyors and actors, and the networks and practices in which they are 
embedded, become crucial sites of inquiry. Knowledge production is a social 
practice, organized by institutional patterns and relational power that reach far 
beyond the intentions of individual planners or theorists. Seeking to pull apart the 
moments and settings where such biases are reproduced, with an eye towards 
reconstituting the assemblage in ways that elevate different actors, perspectives, 
and ways of knowing, is a crucial task. 
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භ Finally, in unsettling times it is necessary to ask unsettling questions about the role 
and purpose of planning theory. 
 
 
Background and Context 
In this essay we take up some of these questions of knowledge production by questioning the 
role of unsettling in, of and for planning theory.  Our intention is not to offer a comprehensive 
treatment of the issue but rather to chart diverse points of entry through which we might 
respond to contemporary challenges. We start from the position that the progress of our 
discipline depends on our collective ability to generate new empirically-grounded insights to 
advance theory that addresses the multiple inequalities, injustices and environmental 
degradations that characterize urban regions today. Yet the task of planning theory cannot only 
ďĞƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐƵĐŚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ?/ƚŵƵƐƚĂůƐŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ?ƐŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƚŽƚĂŬĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽ
find ways of ameliorating inequities and reshaping the forces that reproduce them.  Scanning 
the horizon, we must look to identify key challenges and consider how the next generation of 
planning theory can become a useful tool (or weapon) for thinking, knowing and acting on 
them. But we may also need to look inward and ask whether there are important debates that 
have shaped our field that are in need of unsettling if planning theory is to retain both 
analytical and activist relevance.  
 
In November 2016, Janice, Andy, Crystal and Anne invited twenty-four early career planning 
scholars to meet in advance of the ACSP conference in Portland to discuss the contemporary 
ŝƐƐƵĞƐĨĂĐŝŶŐƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?dŚĞ “hŶƐĞƚƚůŝŶŐWůĂŶŶŝŐdŚĞŽƌǇ ?ǁŽƌŬƐŚŽƉǁĂƐĂǀĞƌǇĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞ
attempt to create new spaces for collegial  W and challenging  W discussion amongst emerging 
voices in planning theory. The list of invitees was drawn from recent presenters in the Planning 
Theory Track at ACSP and, to a lesser extent, the Association of European Schools of Planning 
and World Planning Schools Congress1.  
 
dŚĞƚŚĞŵĞŽĨ ‘hŶƐĞƚƚůŝŶŐ ?ǁĂƐĐŚŽƐĞŶĨŽƌŝƚƐŵƵůƚŝƉůe suggestive possibilities and capacity to act 
as a productive point of departure. Some of these possibilities were explored in an introductory 
 ‘ƉƌŽǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁƌŝƚƚĞŶďǇƚŚĞĨŽƵƌǁŽƌŬƐŚŽƉĐŽŶǀĞŶĞƌƐ ?dŚĞƉƌŽǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶ
communicative, agonistic, just city, sustainability, new materialism, and radical/insurgent 
approaches to planning theory; their potential and limitations in addressing the systemic effects 
of sexism, racism, colonialism, environmental degradation, neoliberalism and 
anthropocentrism. Three dimensions of unsettlement formed the basis of the subsequent 
workshop session  W political; cognitive, emotional and affective; and material, physical and 
spatial  W with participants drawing attention to the complex interrelations between each of 
these categories, and the wide range of questions raised by the multiple meanings of 
unsettling. The discussion continued at a well-attended roundtable session during the ACSP 
conference that generated a wide-range of responses from both early-career and more 
established scholars. These ranged from enthusiastic support for the idea of consciously 
 
1 This strategy did, however, result in a gathering of predominantly white scholars in a country plagued 
by ongoing white supremacy and racial oppression. The four organizers acknowledge and take 
ownership for the failure to sufficiently unsettle the whiteness of planning theory, which is arguably a 
significant symptom of the very problems that we sought to unsettle.  
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seeking new directions for planning theory to others who seemed to feel that the key fights 
have already been fought (and maybe even won). Collectively they laid down a series of 
important challenges, not least to define what might need unsettling and why. 
 
This essay is intended as a means of responding to these challenges and extending the debates 
begun in Portland. We start with a summary framing of unsettlement and its rich and 
potentially challenging resonances for planning theory. The responses that follow are written 
by workshop participants who connect the idea of unsettlement to key challenges they feel 
face planning theory today.  Collectively we ask: is planning theory up to the task of producing 
knowledge for these unsettling times?  
 
 
PART 1: PLANNING THEORY: A PROJECT OF UNSETTLEMENT IN NEED OF UNSETTLING?  
 
WůĂŶŶŝŶŐŝƐ ?ĂůŵŽƐƚďǇĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĚƌŝǀĞŶďǇĂĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌ ‘ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ? PĂǁĂǇŽĨŝŶƐĐƌŝďŝng the legal 
and regulatory order that facilitates the socio-spatial and material inhabiting of a particular lot, 
ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚ ?ĐŝƚǇ ?ŽƌƌĞŐŝŽŶ ? ‘^ĞƚƚůŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂůƐŽĂƉƉůǇƚŽƚŚĞŵŽƌĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚ
procedural dimensions of planning practice. As STS scholar Langdon Winner suggests, politics 
ĐĂŶďĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂƐĂ “ǁĂǇŽĨsettling ĂŶŝƐƐƵĞŝŶƚŚĞĂĨĨĂŝƌƐŽĨĂĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?
emphasis added)2. In this regard, the same might also be said of planning, understood as an 
extension of politics: a set of practices designed to secure a settlement about the long-term 
development of a community that is binding across time and space. These physical and political 
processes of settlement and settling are not only deeply interconnected, but also fix our ways 
of collectively inhabiting and making decisions to particular spatial, political and cultural orders. 
 
tŽƌĚƐůŝŬĞ ‘ƵŶƐĞƚƚůĞ ? ? ‘ƵŶƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƵŶƐĞƚƚůŝŶŐ ?ĂƌĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ĞǀŽŬĞĚďǇƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐƚŽ
disrupt, and to call to account the regressive ways in which structures, processes and relations 
ŝŵƉĞĚĞĞƋƵŝƚǇ ?ũƵƐƚŝĐĞĂŶĚĞĐŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?dŚĞĐĂůůƚŽ ‘ƵŶƐĞƚƚůĞ ? ?Ğ ?Ő ?this paper aims to 
ƵŶƐĞƚƚůĞ ?) often signals an impulse to challenge the dominant forces that shape settlements, 
mobilities, knowledgeƐ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?DŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ?ǁĞŵŝŐŚƚƐĞĞ ‘ƵŶƐĞƚƚůŝŶŐ ?ĂƐ
a characteristic move of critical, post-structuralist analysis that seeks to expose the contingency 
ƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶŶŝŶŐĂůůƐŽĐŝĂůĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŐĞŶĞĂůŽŐŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽrecasting the 
history of the present, for example, is founded on a desire to unsettle taken-for-granted 
categories of knowledge, rendering visible the power relations they conceal so that they can be 
opened to challenge.  
 
Disciplinary development too occurs partly through the unsettlement of prevailing theory. 
Across the critical social and political sciences, the richness of any given sub-discipline can 
arguably be measured by the efforts of scholars to unsettle the various ways we interpret and 
come to know the world. This is not to suggest a teleological process of disciplinary 
development, or even a series of paradigm shifts within which dominant modes of thought 
come to be progressively displaced (Sandercock, 1998b). Rather, it is to value a constant 
process of critical questioning, reframing, and restless searching.  
 
2  With thanks to James McMillan for drawing our attention to this quotation. 
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Despite being a relatively recent endeavor within a young and still disputed disciplinary field 
(Beard and Basolo, 2009), planning theory has itself developed through successive efforts at 
unsettlement. For example, agonistic planning theory emerged through critique of prevailing 
conceptions of communicative rationality (Hillier, 2003; Ploger, 2004), while the ascendency of 
agonism has itself given rise to research exploring the role of post-politics in planning theory 
(Allmendinger and Haughton, 2011; Metzger et al, 2014). Processes of unsettlement like these 
often occur in magpie fashion by borrowing insights from related fields  W sociology, political 
theory, urban geography to name a few  W and bringing them into conversation with specific 
challenges of planning practice. Such productive borrowings are one way of unsettling 
established approaches to reveal their normative and explanatory limits. These borrowings also 
suggest a reliance on ideas from outside the discipline rather than the development of a 
distinctive theoretical tradition. Indeed, this has led some scholars to question if planning 
theory can even be considered a viable proposition (Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000). At least one 
experienced voice has also recently expressed doubts about the purpose of a field that seems 
to be marked by an ever-increasing diversity of approaches and concerns (Faludi, 2017: 102). In 
response, it seems important that we continue to debate the nature and value of contemporary 
planning theories, a process that requires a commitment to critical engagement and unsettling 
of established ideas and practices (Friedmann, 2003; Thomas, 2004).  
 
Space constraints preclude a full review of prevailing approaches to planning theory or a critical 
engagement with what may need unsettling within them. Our intention here is not to be 
iconoclastic and we do not wish to risk proceeding through sweeping generalizations. Recently 
published companions (Healey and Hillier, 2010), collected and reflective essays (Healey and 
Hillier, 2008; Haselsberger, 2017) and handbooks (Gunder et al, 2017), illustrate the diversity of 
approaches and orientations within contemporary planning theory and perhaps also point 
towards a desire to take stock, both of roads taken and missed. Within such volumes, it is 
possible to trace foundational and enduring concerns to sensitize planning scholarship and 
practice to the lived realities of spatial injustices, the historical and contemporary role planning 
has played in their perpetuation, and the value of different ways of struggling against them. 
Such concerns should be nurtured, valued and mined for their continuing capacity to unsettle 
mainstream practices that carry on regardless. 
 
Many of us continue to frame our work through the terms of these established theories of 
planning, and they offer powerful tools for thinking and acting in the world. But it is also 
important to question the adequacy of their response to contemporary challenges and to 
interrogate the extent to which their rationalities may continue to rely on any number of 
settled understandings about planning that pre-suppose a relational order in which, for 
example, people are equal, things are inert, space is available, knowing is conclusive, and power 
is tractable.  We admire and perhaps aspire to these presumptive conditions, but we cannot 
assume their presence without obscuring the uneven power relations characteristic of 
colonialism, sexism, racism, neoliberalism, globalization, and environmental degradation.   
 
In the sections that follow, five short commentaries by Juan, Susmita and Megan, Juliana, and 
Andrew respond to different facets of the challenge of unsettling planning theory by variously 
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considering (1) whether and how existing planning theories are adequate to deal with key 
conflicts or challenges; (2) what theoretical problems remain and are in need of possible 
unsettling; and (3) what theoretical tools or borrowings might enable such an unsettling and 
assist with the further development of planning theory. All the contributions are personal 
responses that are representative of the connections the authors drew between themes raised 
at the workshop and their own areas of scholarship. We have intentionally formatted these as a 
ƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨ ‘ĞƐƐĂǇƐǁŝƚŚŝŶĂŶĞƐƐĂǇ ? ?ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞ authors to write in their own voices. We 
therefore include their names and institutional affiliations at the beginning of their respective 
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĂůůŽǁƌĞĂĚĞƌƐƚŽĚŝƐĐĞƌŶǁŚŽ ?ƐǁŚŽ ?ĂĐŚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇĞŶĚƐǁŝƚŚĂĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ
response (in italicized text) from Andy, Anne, Crystal and Janice that returns to the themes and 
concerns laid out above, pulling out threads that link these commentaries together. 
 
 
PART 2: COMMENTARIES AND RESPONSES 
 
FAIL AGAIN, FAIL WORSE: THE PLANNING VIRTUES OF UNSETTLED THEORY  
Juan J Rivero 
 
The introduction evokes ongoing struggles to assimilate and reconcile planning theory and 
practice with theories and realities of structured inequality. Not coincidentally, it also recalls a 
movie night from a few years back. The event was a screening of My Brooklyn, a documentary 
that tells the story of the gentrification of Downtown Brooklyn as the filmmaker makes sense of 
her own recent arrival in this transitional neighborhood. It depicts the displacement of 
longstanding independent businesses as a result of a planning effort to upzone the district and 
bring it closer in line with the affluent neighborhoods that abut it. After the screening, a panel 
consisting of one of the filmmakers, a planner activist-scholar, and a member of a local 
advocacy group commented on the developments covered by the documentary and fielded 
questions from the audience.  
  
My Brooklyn ?ůŝŬĞŐŽŽĚĨŝůŵƐŽĨŝƚƐŬŝŶĚ ?ŚĂƐĂǁĂǇŽĨŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞǀŝĞǁĞƌƐ ?ƐŬŝŶ ?ĂŶĚƐƵĐŚ
ǁĂƐƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚ ?ƐŽǀĞƌ-capacity crowd, which included veterans from the protests 
against the rezoning. One of them memorably asked the planning scholar what she and fellow 
activists could have done differently. The professor called for more community involvement. 
The activist, visibly frustrated, pointed to the substantial community efforts that had just 
yielded such little fruit.  
  
The post-film panel followed a well-settled structure of academic presentations on 
gentrification ? a tale of marginalization, featuring a familiar cast, and culminating in an 
expected and unsatisfying recommendation. Predictability does not necessarily detract from 
scholarly merit. Like the blues, some stories bear repeating and make a contribution in the 
ƚĞůůŝŶŐ ?ĞǀĞŶǁŚĞŶǇŽƵŬŶŽǁĨƵůůǁĞůůŚŽǁƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŐŽing to end (Baby gonna leave; gonna feel 
ůŝŬĞĐƌǇŝŶ ?). Unlike the blues, however, planning scholarship must do more than deepen our 
understanding of loss; it must guide planning action. It must respond to the question posed at 
the My Brooklyn ƐĐƌĞĞŶŝŶŐ ? “tŚĂƚĐĂŶǁĞĚŽŶŽǁ ? ? ? a question that settled planning 
narratives can never satisfactorily answer, because their settled state depends on glossing over 
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planning practice contingencies that not only complicate but actively shape the translation from 
knowledge to action.  
  
Postmodern theorists, in repudiating the solidity of essentialist grounding, prefer to unsettle (or 
problematize or interrogate) than to debunk and thereby presume an affirmative step toward a 
definitive truth. They eschew the goal and possibility of definitive theoretical advancement in 
favor of progress premised on a provisional and retroactive reframing of theoretical precedent. 
Progress, however, in terms of what? In the quotation above, Friedmann resolves this post-
foundationalist conundrum by differentiating between a better understanding borne out of 
dispassionate observation (a conceit central to not only journalism but also the social sciences) 
and a better understanding organized around a program of action directed toward a desired 
end. In this formulation, planning theory stands out for its primary focus on purposive 
intervention and agency, however fluid the distinction between theory and action may be. 
  
Whether construed as a technocrat, negotiator, advocate, or mediator, the planner acts on the 
basis of both theory in planning and theory of planning. In other words, planning action 
requires knowledge of what is being acted upon and of how to act upon it ? a distinction 
ďůƵƌƌĞĚďǇƉůĂŶŶĞƌƐ ?ĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚŶĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ. Returning to the case of My 
Brooklyn, our understanding of the multi-scalar, over-determined, class process that is 
gentrification becomes actionable to the extent that it accounts for the variable goals and 
positionalities of the planner and other participants in the planning process. Conversely, the 
applicability of theories of planning hinges on their capacity to grapple with complexity as it 
arises in the field of practice. Because of this mutual dependence, the rightness of theories 
about the object of planning must be certified through action rather than empirical verification 
or a hopeful, postmodern aspiration that knowledge (being power) will somehow lead to better 
results.  
  
The introduction identifies several dominant theoretical trends: communicative, agonistic, and 
radical. Although this categorization sets aside important variations within these traditions, it 
does bring into relief their defining orientation as well as the difficulties that they present for 
the planning practitioner. Communicative planning challenges the universalistic assumptions 
that undergird technical expertise, privileging instead authority grounded in collaborative 
deliberation and casting the planner as a mediating agent. Agonistic planning questions the 
counter-hegemonic potential of collaborative deliberation, hitching its hopes of political 
ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽŶĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌŝĂůĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ZĂĚŝĐĂůƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƌĞĂĐƚƐƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
conservative rationalities and seeks progressive change through not just conflictual means, but 
also audacious and creative planning intervention (Sandercock, 2004).  
  
The elaboration and differentiation of these positions on a theoretical plane have relied on 
categorical assertions that elide ambiguities at the heart of planning practice: we do not have 
to embrace the excesses of high modernist planning to recognize that technical expertise plays 
an indispensable role in the process of collaborative deliberation and certainly beyond any 
formally defined deliberative arena. The logical impossibility of absolute inter-subjective 
understanding raised by sympathizers of agonistic theory may serve as fodder against 
communicative planning in poststructuralist debate (Purcell, 2009), but it has little bearing on 
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pragmatic efforts to improve understanding in the service of collaborative action. Capitalist 
development logics may well prevail in mainstream planning, as radical planning theorists 
ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶ ?ďƵƚǇŽƵ ?ĚŚĂǀĞƚŽƐƵďƐĐƌŝďĞƚŽĂƚŽƚĂůŝǌŝŶŐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚǁŝůůĨƵůůǇ
ignore the grĞĂƚĞƌĞƋƵŝƚǇŽĨĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ “ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚ ?ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŽĨŽƌĞĐůŽƐĞƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ
meaningful progressive change within existing structural constraints. 
  
In these and similar examples, theorizing (as an intellectual and institutional practice) valorizes 
qualities ? coherence, distinctiveness, elegance ? that, rather than enhance, may impair its 
applicability. This leads planning theory to make not only unwarranted assumptions concerning 
ƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽƌŽĨƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƐƚƌĂĐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? but also an unwarranted assumption 
about the possibility of sorting out such inequality and intractability at the level of theoretical 
abstraction. To meet the requirements of planners as agents of action situated within a fluid 
political landscape, theorists would do well to balance efforts to settle the merits of theoretical 
propositions with greater emphasis on the limitations of those propositions in their application. 
The recognition that compelling theorizing does not necessarily entail theoretical usefulness 
demands more than a mere reassertion of epistemological humility. It calls for both a 
reconsideration of the scope of planning within conditions of structured inequality, and a 
ƌĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌ ?ƐƚƌĂǀĂŝůƐ ?<ƌƵŵŚŽůǌ ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚƌŽŐŵŽƌƚŽŶ ? ? ?00; Laws and 
Forester, 2015) as emplaced within that field of action (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1979; 
Foglesong, 1986).  
 
dŚĞ ‘ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ?ŽĨƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƌǇůŝĞƐŶŽƚŝŶŝƚƐŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĨŽƌĞƐƚĂůůƐƉĂƚŝĂůŝŶũƵƐƚŝĐĞďƵƚŝŶŝƚƐ
tendency to explain it through a sĞƚƌĞƉĞƌƚŽŝƌĞŽĨŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?ĂƐŝĨƚŚĞƐĞ “ĐůĂƐƐŝĐƐ ?ǁĞƌĞ
universally applicable and actionable. A more satisfactory answer to the My Brooklyn 
question ? what do we do now? ? may very well have still turned to standard accounts of 
gentrification and prescriptions of community involvement, but it would have done so to also 
shed light on how this assessment failed to account for challenges posed by the contingencies 
of this particular case. Through such an approach, planning theory might guide action not 
through mastery of ingenious abstractions but through an ongoing reflection on failure and 
perpetual unsettlement.  
 
 
hŶƐĞƚƚůŝŶŐǁŚĂƚŝƚŵĞĂŶƐƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶĂďůĞ ?ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞůŝĞƐĂƚƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĞŽĨ:ƵĂŶ ?Ɛ
contribution. Calling for purposive intervention Juan seeks ƚŽĨŽƌĞŐƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞ ?ǁŚĂƚ ?ŽĨ
knowledge production. That is, what is it we wish to know? what are we producing 
knowledge for? In light of the challenges presented at the start of this essay, Juan is 
perhaps asking us to evoke a pragmatism through which substantive planning 
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐĐĂŶďĞĐŽŵĞďĞƚƚĞƌ ?ŬŶŽǁŶ ?ĂŶĚŶĞǁƐƚƌĂŶĚƐŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŝƐŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĚŝƐƉĂƌĂƚĞ
actions and ends desired might become possible. Importantly, the process of knowledge 
production is a situated practice that draws inspiration from seeking new ways of 
knowing general problems within specific contexts, such as gentrification in Brooklyn. In 
other cases, the problems we identify are perhaps more fully structural, historical and 
hegemonic, such as private property rights in the case below, with important 
implications for how we might unsettle processes of knowledge production.   
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QUESTIONING PROPERTY IN PLANNING  
Susmita Rishi and Megan Horst 
 
ƐŶŽƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚƐ ? “ƵŶƐĞƚƚůŝŶŐ ?ŽĨƚĞŶƐŝŐŶĂůƐĂŶŝŵƉƵůƐĞƚŽĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŚĞ
dominant forces that shape neighborhoods, cities and urban regions. In this response, we 
suggest that one dominant force needing unsettling is Property and particularly Private Property 
regimes. We begin this piece with a brief discussion of how planning practice and theory has 
failed to problematize property thoroughly. We then point out two key avenues that planning 
theory can draw on to deepen its attention to property (without falling into the totalizing 
conception of capitalism that Juan warns against): alternative epistemologies and ontologies, 
and contemporary social movements.  
 
We choose to focus on property because it is fundamental to planning, and because property is 
at the heart of many structurally rooted inequalities as well as movements for greater justice. 
As such, property merits a critical and thorough examination from planners.  However, 
ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ?ƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇŝƐůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞůŝďĞƌĂů-
economistic model of property (Blomley, 2008). This model involves a binary conceptualization 
of public (state-owned and controlled land) and private property. When we fail to challenge this 
narrow binary, we ignore alternative options and narrow our scope for intervention (Porter, 
2010). For example, planners typically ĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐďǇƌĞƐƚŽƌŝŶŐ “ŽƌĚĞƌ ?ƚŽ
the city often by bringing them into the fold of formal private land markets. However, 
subsuming these settlements into the formal economy opens them to the forces of the market 
including speculation (Mukhija, 2003).  Gentrification of these spaces further displaces the 
original residents, who then move to other settlements only to become squatters again 
(Samper, 2011).  This repeated pattern begs a new approach to property. 
 
Another limitation is that planning interventions have focused primarily on asking where 
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƵƐĞƐŐŽ ?<ƌƵĐŬĞďĞƌŐ ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶWŽƌƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ǁĞŝŶƐƚĞĂĚĂƐŬ “ƚŽǁŚŽŵĚŽƚŚŝŶŐƐ
ďĞůŽŶŐ ? ?dŚŝƐůŝŶĞŽĨƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐďĞŐŝŶƐƚŽƵŶƐĞƚƚůĞƚŚĞĂƐƐƵŵĞĚĐůĂƌŝƚǇŽĨƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚ
other structures including settler colonialism, racism, sexism, capitalism and neoliberalism that 
are at the base of all unequal property relations. By examining the process of settler 
colonialism, we acknowledge that settlers have claimed indigenous land as theirs to own and 
profit from, and that the disruption by settlers to indigenous relationships to land continues 
today (Tuck and Yang, 2012). We confront how structural racism limits  people of color from 
owning land in the United States. We also unpack how under neoliberal capitalism, poorer city 
residents face displacement by more economically advantaged users.  Finally, by asking who 
has the right to land, we also push back against the idea that economic exchange value 
supersedes use value, and that ownership rights supersede all others. 
 
Historically, planning theories have not centered on challenging the liberal-economist model of 
private property or on understanding how different understandings of property open up 
possibilities for more just planning. Instead, the main theories of and in planning (e.g. rational 
comprehensive, advocacy, communicative) have been procedurally-focused, with less attention 
to specific areas of action. Yet some key planning theories do lend support to a focus on 
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property. Advocacy and equity planning, for example, ask planners to attend to the interests of 
the poor and other historically marginalized groups, a goal that can only be pursued through a 
critical focus on property.  Radical planning challenges market-led planning, including the 
dominance of private property. This has included some attention to questions of property. For 
example, scholarship on gentrification has highlighted the influences of capitalism and racism 
on displacement of vulnerable communities. Scholarship on commons models, like community 
land trusts, has been developed in response to problems like the lack of affordable housing. 
These theories can be built upon to better address property. 
 
Some contemporary planning theorists have questioned the dominance of the private property 
ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?WŽƌƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐĨŽĐƵƐŚĂƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇĞŶƚĞƌĞĚƚŚĞ “ĐĂŶŽŶ ?ŽĨƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞŽƌǇǇĞƚ ?&ĂǁĂǌƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚĂůŝŵŝƚĞĚĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇůĞĂĚƐƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƚŽƌĞƉůŝĐĂƚĞ “ƚŚĞ
inequalities inscribed in existing property ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ǁŚŝůƐƚWŽƌƚĞƌƐĞĞŬƐƚŽƵŶƐĞƚƚůĞ
ĂŶ “ĂƐƐƵŵĞĚĐůĂƌŝƚǇŽĨǁŚŽŚĂƐƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽǁŚĂƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?ǇĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇŽŶ
property, radical planning theorists can not only unsettle the hegemony of private property, but 
also develop new ways of understanding property and valuing relationships to land beyond 
private ownership.  
 
In this endeavor planning scholars can learn from indigenous scholars who have long critiqued 
dominant property models and discussed alternative forms of land ownership and 
management. Porter and Barry (2016), for example, explore the complicity of planning in 
forwarding settler-colonial conceptions of private property and ownership, proposing ways in 
which we might move towards more respectful coexistence. Moreton-Robinson (2015) shows 
how a white understanding of land ownership as private property devalues and erases 
Indigenous ways of understanding and valuing land. Keenan (2015) meanwhile offers an 
alternative understanding of property as a relationship of belonging that is neither fixed or 
essential but rather temporally and spatially contingent (Piedalue and Rishi, 2017). These works 
illustrate that centering on alternative epistemological frameworks, whether Indigenous, Black, 
Latinx or otherwise, might help planners confront not just other ways of knowing property but 
ĂůƐŽ ?ŽƚŚĞƌůĂǇĞƌƐŽĨŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ƵŶƐĞƚƚůŝŶŐ ? ? 
 
Planning theorists can also look to contemporary social movements for alternative 
epistemologies and ontologies of property. Diverse movements around the world, from the 
Landless Workers¶Movement in Brazil and Bhoomi Ucched Pratirodh in India, to Western Cape 
Anti-Eviction Campaign in South Africa and Slum Dwellers International are claiming rights to 
land and promoting alternative, non-capitalist modes of property ownership. In the U.S., 
indigenous communities including the Standing Rock Sioux and the Hope, Zuni, Ute and Navajo  
are contesting resource extraction and demanding more indigenous input over their historical 
but now federally-owned land. Leaders of the national Black Lives Matter policy platform are 
calling for greater Black access to and control of land. Under the Occupy movement, activists 
have occupied the farm in Berkley, California, as well as in thousands of other places around the 
world. People without formal housing are working collectively to stake out safe spaces for 
unhoused people to rest and sleep, such as Right 2 Dream Too in Portland, Oregon. These 
diverse movements and their non-binary approaches to property should be of great interest to 
planning theorists.  
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Susmita ĂŶĚDĞŐĂŶ ?ƐƉŝĞĐĞŵĂƌŬƐĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞ ?ĐĂůůŝŶŐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƐŽŵĞŽĨ
the spatial and material practices of planning that may need to be quite fundamentally 
unsettled. While their commentary quite intentionally draws our focus away from the 
previous line of questioning about how planning knowledge is produced and by whom, 
they speak to the potential importance of conflict and agonism. By focusing on a range 
of struggles that emerge out of a particular and pernicious binary in planning theory and 
practice, they implicitly (if not explicitly) suggest that the study of counter-hegemonic 
social movements can signal new ways of understanding and taking action in our urban 
ĂŶĚƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?:ƵůŝĂŶĂ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇďĞůŽǁƉŝĐŬƐƵƉŽŶƚŚŝƐƚŚĞŵĞĂŶĚĂƐŬs 
us, as theorists, to reconsider how we position ourselves with respect to the social 
movements we are studying. 
 
UNSETTLING DETACHMENT IN PLANNING THEORIZING 
Juliana M. Zanotto 
 
For theories to help us move toward social justice by guiding purposive intervention, as Juan 
puts it, theorists must embrace their responsibility to elevate the voices of vulnerable 
individuals and communities. This requires not only a commitment to the goal of advancing 
justice (even when it entails failure and perpetual unsettlement) but also a thoughtful and 
critical consideration of what methods of knowledge production are better equipped to 
produce such theories. Existing scholarship, particularly agonistic (McClymont, 2011; Ploger, 
2004) and insurgent (Miraftab, 2009) theories, rightfully account for the role of politicization, 
conflict, social mobilization, and counter-hegemonic practices in planning. But, for the most 
part, theorizing follows mainstream social science methods that centres the role of a neutral, 
objective observer. Here, I want to argue that the objectivity and distancing of conventional 
social science methods limit the development of insights that arise from engagement in the 
field, where interactions with sites and people reveal the complexities, ugliness, and injustices 
of oppression. Theorization toward social justice requires theorists to unsettle detachment in 
planning theory and to be present  W body, mind, and heart  W in the field.  
 
The need to unsettle detachment in theorizing does not emerge from the conclusion that 
existing theories are unable to address current challenges. It comes from the realization that 
what urban planners perceive as current challenges (i.e. police brutality, xenophobia, racism, 
segregation, inequality, informality) are rather old, historically ingrained, challenges that 
planning theories and the practices they inform have failed to address. Trumpism, for instance, 
does not reveal itself as shocking to those who have experienced overt and covert 
discrimination as part of their lives and collective history. 
 
The social sciences are no better equipped to address systems of oppression today than they 
ǁĞƌĞĂŚƵŶĚƌĞĚǇĞĂƌƐĂŐŽǁŚĞŶt ? ? ?ƵŽŝƐŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ŽŶĞĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĂĐĂůŵ ?ĐŽŽů ?ĂŶĚ
detached scientist while Negroes wĞƌĞůǇŶĐŚĞĚ ?ŵƵƌĚĞƌĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƐƚĂƌǀĞĚ ? ?ŽƐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƵŽŝƐ
disbelief in objectivity and neutrality as adequate scientific methods to deal with the violent 
reality around him continues to be expressed in the academy today, including among planning 
theoristƐ ?dŚĞĐĂůůĨŽƌŶĞǁŵĞƚŚŽĚƐŽĨƐƚƵĚǇŝŶŐƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƐƚŚĞ “ŶĞĞĚƚŽƌĞĂĐŚĨĂƌ
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ďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌƐĐŽƉĞŽĨ ‘ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŽƌǇƐŽĐŝĂůƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ “ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůƐŽĐŝĂůƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ
ŚĂƐŚĂĚƵƐǁĂŝƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞďƵƐƐƚĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŽƵƌƉůĂŶĞ ? ?&ŽƌĞƐƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?This is a realization 
ƚŚĂƚƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐǁŚŽŚĂǀĞďĞĐŽŵĞ “ůĞƐƐƉĂƚŝĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĚŽŶĞĨƌŽŵĂƐĂĨĞƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚ
ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂůĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ŚĂǀĞĞŵďƌĂĐĞĚ ?ŽůůĞŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? 
 
I will borrow from the insights of Brazilian scholars to illustrate the potential of theorizing from 
experiences of engagement on the ground. As the city of Rio de Janeiro prepared to host a 
series of mega events, including the 2016 Olympics, residents of a low-income neighborhood 
situated in a prime location were constantly threatened with orders of removal. Alleging a 
variety of reasons, including aesthetic damage, pollution of the adjacent lagoon, threats to the 
security of athletes, obstruction of a planned bus rapid transit route, and incompatibility with 
plans for the Olympic Park, the municipality issued several removal orders. These orders 
ignored the fact that the residents had been granted legal rights to the land and that the 
peaceful and thriving community had invested in infrastructure. As part of their resistance, 
residents decided to develop an alternative plan that reconciled the technical concerns of the 
city while preserving their right to the land. They sought the collaboration of two public 
universities whose planning students and faculty assisted in the co-production of a plan to 
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?
 
The experience of the planning scholars who participated in the co-creation of the plan 
afforded them a special position from which to theorize. Writing about this experience, they 
conceptualize planning as ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƵĂů P “ĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƚŽƉůĂŶĂŶĚƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƚŽĨŝŐŚƚ ? sĂŝŶĞƌĂƚĂů ? ?
2016). This framework characterizes planning as a weapon in the confrontation between 
groups. Though the state is heavily armed with official plans and narratives, communities may 
equally arm themselves with counter narratives and alternative plans. 
 
Conflictual planning, as theorized from real experiences of conflict, is not about mediation. It is 
about embracing urban conflictuality as a) the very mechanism that enables creative and 
counter-hegemonic actions and conceptions to emerge from within subordinate classes, and b) 
the process through which collectives are afforded an opportunity to autonomously occupy the 
public scene (Vainer at al., 2016). Beyond its similarities to insurgent planning, the experience 
of conflictual planning highlights the production of plans as oriented by the nature and context 
of the conflict in question. In this way, the methods and contents of plans evolve depending on 
what weapons are needed to fight each battle (Vainer at al., 2016). Thus, planning becomes a 
counter-hegemonic practice of resistance against state narratives and proposals.  
 
The scholars offered to the community the services planners often provide to developers and 
public agencies. On the ground, they were not neutral and detached observers reporting on the 
development of a conflict and/or theorizing ways to understand the mechanisms involved. They 
were not interested in objective analysis. They were, instead, fully aware of the politics of their 
work and their ability as scholars and planners representing both a prestigious academic 
institution and a legitimate professional field to lift up the voices of the most vulnerable. 
 
:ƵůŝĂŶĂ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇƚĂŬĞƐƵƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌďǇŝŶƋƵŝƌŝŶŐŚŽǁ ?ĂƐƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ, we might produce 
knowledge differently in response to the enduring realities of dispossession, 
13 
 
discrimination and displacement discussed by Megan and Susmita. Echoing Juan, she 
calls for a praxis that actively engages with the world, chooses sides and forges 
ƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚŝĞƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ ?ƌĂŝƐĞƚŚĞǀŽŝĐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ? ?WƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƌǇŝŶ
this way requires a questioning of academic detachment that may be profoundly 
unsettling of existing knowledges, relations and identities. Perhaps an ethical response 
to an unjust world requires that we put more of ourselves on the line, opening up to the 
creation of new and deeply-felt attachments. In our final contribution Andrew takes 
these themes about the relational and affective dimensions of knowledge production 
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?,ĞĂƐŬƐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ?ŝŶƵŶƐĞƚƚůŝŶŐƚŝŵĞƐ ?ǁĞŵŝŐŚƚĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇĞŵďƌĂĐĞĂ ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ
ƐƉŝƌŝƚŽĨƌĞƐƚůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐ ? ?ƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶŶĞĚďǇĂƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐĂŶĚƉŽĞƚŝĐĞƚŚŽƐŽĨůŽǀĞ ?ĐĂƉĂďůĞŶŽƚ
just of engaging with friends but also of struggling with foes. 
 
 
REMAINING UNSETTLED 
 Andrew Zitcer 
 
Unsettling times call for unsettling measures. As the Introduction makes clear, planning theory 
requires a constant interrogation of our habits of inquiry and sense-making. This reckoning only 
increases in urgency as the disconnect between our values and the world around us grows 
starker. Though we might desire resolution, we should cease our longing for some imagined 
period of continuity and stability. Rather, we should make permanent our state of 
unsettlement, since settlement frequently perpetuates injustice. We need only to look to the 
ongoing violence of settler colonialism, and the initiatives that have arisen to combat it, as 
described by Susmita and Megan. By unsettling property relations, activists around the world 
advance spatial justice. As planning theorists and practitioners, Juan reminds us that we are 
embedded in a dialectical relationship between theorizing in planning and theorizing about 
planning. Those who value theory must seek to integrate these impulses; we cultivate the 
capacity for reflection-in-action, rather than the reductive sort of technical mastery that 
alienates as many as it dazzles.  
 
Ultimately, spatial justice, rendered in a spirit of productive restlessness, depends on theory 
and methods that may sound strange on our planner ?ƐůŝƉƐ ?tĞŶĞĞĚƚŽĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚĞĂ
vocabulary suited to this moment. Perhaps our incantation can take the following form: 
pragmatism as the theory; poetry as the method; the ethos is love. (Sometimes these 
reimaginings are based on very old ideas.) By mouthing these words, let us recover even a 
temporary firmness beneath our feet.  
 
Why begin with pragmatism? It is an approach that embraces precisely the sort of uncertainty 
we describe in this provocation. As an anti-foundationalist philosophy, pragmatism rejects 
dualisms of theory and practice, process and outcomes (Lake, 2016: 1208). Rather than seeking 
to determine a fundamental reality and hold firm to it, pragmatism searches out what works 
under a given set of conditions. Recent planning scholarship has brought Deweyan pragmatism 
back to light (Forester, 2013; Lake, 2016, 2017), imbuing it with a contemporary urgency. As a 
ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐŵƐĞĞŬƐƚŽƉĞƌĨĞĐƚĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇƚŚŽƵŐŚ “ƚŚĞŵŽƌĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐ
to others in the collective project of hammering out answers to the question of how we should 
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ůŝǀĞ ? ?>ĂŬĞ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?DĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ŶƚŚŝƐĞƐƐĂǇĐŽƵůĚĨŝŶĚƚŚĞƐƚŝƌƌŝŶŐƐŽĨ
a solution in a planning context grounded in moral practice. 
 
A planning context informed by pragmatism must be simultaneously animated by suitable 
methods of inquiry. Alongside careful rational questioning of our circumstances, we must make 
room for other ways of knowing and disseminating knowledge. Beginning in the late 1980s, 
Richard Rorty began to trace a poetic logic through (Western) philosophy and literature. He 
ƐŽƵŐŚƚǁŝƐĚŽŵŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĨŽƌŵƐŽĨŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĐŽŵďŝŶŝŶŐ “ĂĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐƚŽŶĞǁƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ
ǁŝƚŚĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌŝƚǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞŽǀĞƌƚĂŬĞŶŵĂŶǇƉĂƐƚƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ? ?ZŽƌƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? P 61). The 
method he advocates is not a poetics of Platonic ideals; it is a poetics of process and becoming. 
ZŽƌƚǇ ?ƐŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ-infused pragmatism should be placed alongside calls within planning for more 
focus on dramaturgy (Rannila and Loivaranta, 2015), film (Sandercock and Attili, 2010), and the 
training of planners to write stories (Baum, 2017). Such imaginative planning methods 
deliberately unsettle the manner in which knowledge is produced, often opening up spaces for 
dialogue with citizens who are unmoved by technical rationality and may be stuck in narratives 
that limit their ability to dream into the future. 
 
Encouraging people to dream requires an ethic of love. Love is a scarce resource in the 
contemporary public sphere; all the more reason to seek its development. Overcoming 
detachment, as Juliana makes clear, is fraught with possibilities including anger, sadness, and 
shock. But we must throw open that door, knowing that any quest for justice is ultimately a 
product of love. Without love and the trust that undergirds it, planning processes are governed 
by unequal power relations. Love may be a corrective, but it is also a process, not an ideal state; 
the work of love is never finished. According to bell hooks (2000), the act of loving the other 
neeĚƐƚŽďĞƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶĨĞĂƌůĞƐƐůǇĂŶĚǁŝƚŚĂĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐŽĨůŽǀĞ ?ƐĞƚŚŝĐĂůƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ
(Kondo, 2012). There are a number of practical actions we planners can perform to build a 
ƚƌƵƐƚŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚĐůĂƐƐƌŽŽŵƐǁŚĞƌĞǁĞǁŽƌŬ ?zŽƵŶŐ ?Ɛ (2000) 
discussions of greeting, rhetoric and narrative are helpful guides to stimulate loving praxis. But 
ǁĞŵƵƐƚďĞĐůĞĂƌǁŚĂƚǁĞŵĞĂŶǁŚĞŶǁĞƵƐĞƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ůŽǀĞ ? ?>ŽǀĞĐŽŵĞƐŝŶŵĂŶǇǀĂƌŝĞƚŝĞƐ ?
There is a danger to get caught up in agape ?ƚŚĞ “'ŝĨƚ-ůŽǀĞ ? that views the other as a hapless 
soul to be saved, out of the goodness of our hearts (Zitcer and Lake, 2012). Instead, we ought to 
cultivate philia, a form of political friendship that is based on reciprocal communication, 
vulnerability, and shared risk.   
 
Hannah Arendt maintains that such public expressions of love should advance the project of 
ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽůŽǀĞ ?ƐƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ?ĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞĂŶĚƵŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů manifestations (Chiba, 1995). 
>ŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶůŝĞƐŝŶĂŶĂŐŽŶŝƐƚŝĐ ?ƉƵďůŝĐƉƌŽũĞĐƚŽĨƌĞĐŬŽŶŝŶŐǁŝƚŚůŽǀĞ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ?/ƚŝƐ
easy, after all, to feel love for those with whom we make common cause, or for whom we bear 
sympathy. But that is not what the moment demands. We must also encounter and struggle 
with those whose ideas we find unsettling. To find philia among these challenging others may 
require acknowledgement of the other within ourselves. We can form common cause through 
hopeful and loving examples, from expressions of cathartic communal dance led throughout 
Canada by Indigenous activists (Weir, 2017) to interfaith movements to protect Muslims from 
harassment as they pray. We learn from the Indigenous planning scholars cited at the beginning 
of the provocation that many struggles in planning ought to be led by communities that have 
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their own ways of knowing, being and doing. Unsettling from a distance can only get so far; 
there will be times when activist-planner-scholars must hang back. In these moments, we might 
find ways to stand in solidarity in support of new manifestations of spatial justice. But while we 
seek justice and ameliorations of the conditions of crisis, we will not seek closure of our hearts 
and minds. Our unsettlement, our restlessness will be our strength. 
 
ŶĚƌĞǁ ?ƐĞǀŽĐĂƚŝǀĞĐĂůůĨŽƌphilia in our planning relations brings us to an aspirational 
place of tolerance for and patience with ourselves, as we try to understand the practical 
and theoretical challenges of situated knowledge and planning action. This commitment 
helps to make sensible (Weick 1995) the shared process of the workshop and collective 
essay itself: emergent and not-neat, our conversation has threaded through time and 
space, seeking to embolden and connect, rather than control and delimit. Concluding, 
then, poses an especial challenge; our voices are hardly rising in unison, and this seems 
quite hopeful, intellectually, if not yet harmonious. Juan implies that the context for 
action should better inform planning inquiry and interpretation; Susmita and Megan 
foreground a context for action that is itself problematic, asking us to interrogate its 
pervasiveness, perhaps even as we act within it. Juliana insists that we form attachments 
to planning contexts that compel, rather than politely invite us to act; and Andrew 
situates these fundamentally political relations of our work, inquiry, and affiliations in 
the paradox of a love that is public, patient, pragmatic, and personal. It is the personal 
where we conclude: the ongoing task of learning through, for, and with each other, 
seeking to act for justice in our planning communities, activist, academic, and otherwise, 
and beginning with a willingness to unsettle and possibly reorient the bounds and intents 
of our own self-knowledge.  
 
 
PART 3 CONCLUSION: PLANNING THEORIZING AS AN UNSETTLING EXERCISE IN THE 
PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
Reflection is the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of 
our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called into question. 
(Heidegger, 1977:116) 
 
There is the shared sense running through the contributions above that our embeddedness in 
the systems of thought and action that shape spatial planning and its theorization may keep us 
from grasping pressing and consequential realities of the current age. Various fields proclaim 
that we are moving from one era, to another, as-ǇĞƚƉŽŽƌůǇĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂŶĚ “ƐĞƚŝŶƉůĂĐĞ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
representations of Nature and history as Heidegger puts it (1977: 127)  W for instance, out of 
Modernity, resource abundance and widespread democratization; into the Anthropocene, 
global urbanization, technological transformation, climate change and growing class inequality. 
As we encounter and experience a rapidly changing world, the question of how our own 
worldviews  W ŽƵƌ ‘ďĞŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? ?>Žǁ ?^ƚƵƌƵƉ ? ? ? ? ? ?- influence, or hold us back and 
keep us from accurately apprehending and acting constructively becomes an essential question 
for planning theory. Are our knowledge practices reproducing the problems that we study? 
Inevitably, a multi-authored exploration like this does not and cannot contain a definitive 
response to such a question, but this essay has argued that the times we are now living through 
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require a shared commitment to keep asking, and trying to answer, such seriously unsettling 
questions.   
 
Our conclusions are therefore necessarily tentative and by no means a throwing-over of the 
theory that has guided our planning inquiries and pedagogies  W nor could they be perhaps, 
reliant as we are on the established ways of knowing that organize our faculties of perception, 
interpretation, and communication (and which have shaped our formation as planning-
scholars). Rather, this is a call to consider anew the worldview forming academic research and 
ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ŵĂŬŝŶŐƐƉĂĐĞĨŽƌĂ “ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐĂŶĚƐŚĂƉŝŶŐŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌŽĨ
ŐĞŶƵŝŶĞƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?WůĂŶŶŝŶŐƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉŚĂƐůŽŶŐǀĂůƵĞĚƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌŽĨ
critical, reflective practice (Forester, 1999; Schön, 1984); a practice that entails an ongoing 
commitment to reflect on the phenomenon of knowledge production itself (Yanow & Tsoukas, 
2009), foregrounding, considering and problematizing its presumptions and aims. In other 
words, a foundational commitment to the continual unsettling of our ways of knowing.  
 
The contributions here point towards the ongoing importance of working to sensitize planning 
theory to its potential complicity in persistent forms of marginalization and oppression.  
However, even as our contributions value the tools of deconstruction developed by critical 
social science, they also recognize the imperative to go further, to imagine and enact 
alternatives. Moving towards action by engaging constructively in and against forces of 
exploitation and degradation, however, presents its own daunting challenges that frequently 
unsettle what we know, how we act and relate to others, and even who we think we are. 
Unsettlement is not only a condition of the contemporary world or a question of what planning 
theory is or is not doing for us then; rather, it is also crucial to any examination of our own 
dispositions toward the practice of theorizing, the habits of inquiry, interpretation, and 
relational sense-making that emerge from myriad situated encounters where knowledge 
becomes action. In this regard, our best response to unsettling times may be to continue 
learning, struggling to know as we act in respectful and loving solidarity with others.  
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